Florida International University

FIU Digital Commons
DRR Student Publications

Extreme Events Institute

12-17-2010

Pre-Disaster Risk Management in Post-Earthquake
(1999) Turkey
Engin Ibrahim Erdem
Florida International University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/drr_student
Recommended Citation
Erdem, E.I. (2010). Pre-disaster risk management in post-earthquake (1999) Turkey. Disaster Risk Reduction Program, Florida
International University.

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the Extreme Events Institute at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
DRR Student Publications by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

Pre-Disaster Risk Management in Post-Earthquake (1999) Turkey

Engin I. Erdem
Disaster Risk Reduction Program
Florida International University

December 17, 2010

Abstract:
This paper assesses the status of pre-disaster risk management in the case of Turkey. By
focusing on the period following the catastrophic August 17, 1999 earthquake, the study benefits
from USAID’s Disaster Risk Management Benchmarking Tool (DRMBT). In line with the
benchmarking tool, the paper covers key developments in the four components of pre-disaster
risk management, namely: risk identification, risk mitigation, risk transfer and disaster
preparedness. In the end, it will present three major conclusions: (i) Although post-1999 Turkey
has made some important progress in the pre-disaster phase of DRM, particularly with the
enactment of obligatory earthquake insurance and tightened standards for building construction,
the country is far away from substantial levels of success in DRM. (ii) In recent years, local
governments have had been given more authority in the realm of DRM, however, Turkey’s
approach to DRM is still predominantly centralized at the expense of successful DRM practices
at the local level. (iii) While the devastating 1999 earthquake has resulted in advances in the predisaster components of DRM; progress has been mostly in the realm of earthquakes. Turkey’s
other major disasters (landslides, floods, wild fires i.e.) also require similar attention by local and
central authorities.
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Introduction
Turkey, which is located at the juncture of three continents, namely Europe, Asia, and
Africa, has suffered from several disasters throughout its history. The North Anatolian Fault, one
of the most vigorous seismic zones in the world, has resulted in two of the most devastating
earthquakes in the country’s history. In the 1939 Erzincan (Northwestern city) earthquake, more
than thirty-two thousand people died, while the recent August 1999 earthquake in the Marmara
region resulted in huge human and economic costs. More than seventeen thousand people lost
their lives, around fifty thousand people were injured, and Turkey experienced economic losses
of about five percent of its GDP. In addition to these two earthquakes, more than twenty
thousand people died in other major earthquakes throughout the country from 1939 to 2010.
Moreover, floods, landslides, and wild fires are other major disasters that habitually threaten the
people of Turkey. From 1975 to 2010, more than six hundred people died due to floods.
The August 17, 1999 earthquake was an important test to assess Turkey’s development in
terms of Disaster Risk Management. A few years before the devastating event, experts from the
U.S. Geological Survey and Turkish scholars declared the potential of a high magnitude
earthquake in the Marmara region. Having missed these evaluations, the Turkish state and the
people largely failed to act before the disaster or respond effectively during it, leading to a higher
human and economic toll than perhaps would have occurred if the state had acted upon this
knowledge. If Turkey had a better DRM framework, many experts argue, the devastation could
have been much lower. The August 17 earthquake was particularly notable in demonstrating the
serious deficiencies in the country’s risk mitigation, risk transfer and disaster preparedness
efforts.

1

This study attempts to assess the status of pre-disaster risk management in Turkey
following the August 17, 1999 earthquake. To do so, it utilizes USAID’s “Disaster Risk
Management Benchmarking Tool”. While this paper does not use the 276 questions employed in
the benchmarking tool for the assessment of Turkey’s DRM, it does incorporate an evaluation of
four key areas (policy-legislation, local government, education-public awareness, and
international support) of its pre-disaster risk management.
In what follows, a brief discussion of the August 17, 1999 earthquake will take place. In
particular, the section will present the major lessons of the earthquake and their impact on
Turkey’s level of progress in the realm of DRM. Then, the paper will highlight USAID’s
Benchmarking Tool (DRMBT), its purpose, and the way it is used. In the following part, the
status of pre-disaster risk management in Turkey will be examined utilizing aspects of the
Benchmarking Tool. In doing so, the section will provide an overview of the key DRM related
developments in the aftermath of the 1999 earthquake. Finally, the concluding section will not
only be an overview of the paper but also proffer policy suggestions for the Turkish authorities.

The August 17, 1999 Earthquake
The August 17, 1999 Izmit/Marmara earthquake is one of the most disastrous seismic
events in Turkey’s recent history. Since the 1939 Erzincan earthquake, which resulted in more
than thirty-two thousand deaths, the country has witnessed seven earthquakes with a Richter
scale of 7 and above. (Table 1) The recent August 1999 earthquake comes only second to the
1939 earthquake in terms of the human toll, causing more than seventeen thousand deaths, and
about fifty thousand more injuries. The earthquake also affected 120,000 housing units, resulting
in heavy damages and collapses, In addition, leaving four to six hundred thousand people
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homeless. On the economic side, Turkey faced a loss of about 8-30 billion dollars.1 The
earthquake hit the key industrial region of the country, substantially enhancing the level of
economic losses.2
Table 1: Major Earthquakes in Turkey (1939-2010)
Earthquake (Date, City, Region)
1939 12 26, Erzincan, East
1942 12 20, Tokat, Central
1943 11 26, Samsun, North
1944 02 01, Bolu, Northwest
1953 03 18, Balikesir, West
1966 08 19, Mus, East
1970 03 28, Izmir, West
1975 09 06, Diyarbakir, Southeast
1983 10 30, Erzurum, East
1999 08 17, Izmit, Northwest
1999 11 12, Duzce, Northwest
2003 05 01, Bingol, East
2010 03 08, Bingol, East

Magnitude
7.8
7.6
7.6
7.4
7.3
6.8
6.9
6.7
6.9
7.4
7.2
6.4
6.1

Fatalities
32,700
4,000
4,000
2,790
1,073
1,529
1,086
2000
1,342
17,118
894
177
51

Source: U.S Geological Survey, “Historic World Earthquakes”, Turkey
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/historical_country.php#turkey

Turkey’s weak record of Disaster Risk Management was a major reason for the high
human and economic losses related to the 1999 earthquake. In other words, Turkey could have
avoided substantial losses if it had performed better in the various dimensions of pre-disaster risk
management. In this regard, one should discuss Turkey’s particular failures in risk mitigation and
disaster preparedness. For example, the U.S. Geological Survey and Turkish scholars made a 1220% prediction that the Marmara region could have an earthquake with a 6.5 or above magnitude
on the Richter scale by 2025, two years before the event.3 Nonetheless, the earthquake caught the
1

“Event Report: Kocaeli, Turkey Earthquake”, RMS Reconnaissance Team, Risk Management Solutions, Inc.
(http://www.rms.com/Publications/Turkey_Event.pdf), Murat Saatcioglu et al 2001, “The August 17, 1999, Kocaeli
(Turkey) earthquake — Damage to Structures”, Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering, 28: 715-737
2
The Izmit-Istanbul (Marmara) region, in which the earthquake hit most, generates forty percent of Turkey’s annual
industrial production with about 7 percent of GDP. (“Event Report: Kocaeli, Turkey Earthquake”)
3
“Event Report: Kocaeli, Turkey Earthquake”
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region unprepared. First of all, as the most industrialized and urbanized part of the country, the
region had high rates of poorly designed and constructed buildings. A majority of residential
buildings in the region were multi-story (4 to 8) apartments, many which failed to meet building
codes. Though Turkey had a modern building code, to a great extent, it failed in its
implementation and enforcement.4 Particularly notable was the fact that the government allowed
many buildings in the earthquake region to be built upon active faults. In the end, this level of
incompetence weak enforcement made the August 17 earthquake a much more devastating
natural disaster for the country than it might have been given stronger state action in this regard.
A major lesson from the 1999 earthquake is that Turkey cannot afford to continue living
with weak DRM mechanisms. Many Turkish and international scientists believe that there is a 60
percent chance of another major earthquake along the North Anatolian Fault, which the
metropolitan city of Istanbul essentially sits on, by 2030.5 Such a massive earthquake is expected
to result in hundreds of thousands of people dead and over a hundred billion dollars in economic
losses.6 Therefore, as a country located near the powerful North Anatolian Fault, the Turkish
government and society should take DRM more seriously. (Figure 1) In Turkey, 43 percent of
city centers are within the highest earthquake risk zone, while 27 percent are located in the
second most risky zone. The third zone incorporates 16 percent of the country’s city centers, the
fourth zone includes 11 percent of Turkey’s city centers, and while the lowest risk earthquake
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Turkey’s 1975-year building code was adapted from the Uniform Building Code in California. “Izmit, Turkey
Earthquake
of
August
17,
1999”,
EQE
Briefing
(Available
online
at:
http://www.absconsulting.com/resources/Catastrophe_Reports/izmit-Turkey-1999.pdf)
5
“Istanbul quake likely by 2030”, BBC news, April 27, 2000
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/727966.stm)
6
“Event Report: Kocaeli, Turkey Earthquake”
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zone has only 3 percent of its city centers.7 Therefore, improving the level of DRM performance
should be a national priority for the earthquake prone Turkey.
Figure 1: Seismic Hazard Map of Turkey

Source: The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, 1996. The map is taken from the website of the Disaster and
Emergency
Management
Presidency,
Office
of
the
Prime
Minister
(Ankara,
Turkey
/
http://www.deprem.gov.tr/sarbis/Shared/DepremHaritalari.aspx
http://www.deprem.gov.tr/sarbis/Shared/DepremHaritalari.aspx)
Note: The earthquake hazard map shows five levels of risk across the country. While the red areas involve the
highest risk (Level 1) the white colored part of country is prone to the lowest risk (Level 5)
5).. The pink areas refer to
the risk level II, the yellow areas
reas have the risk level III, and the light yellow regions involve the risk level IV.
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Bulent Ozmen 2000, 17 Agustos 1999 Izmit Korfezi Depreminin Hasar Durumu
Durumu- The Damage Condition of the
August 17, 1999 Earthquake, Turkish Earthquake Foundation, Ankara, Turkey
(It is available online at: http://www.deprem.gazi.edu.tr/upload/20071103143847.pdf
http://www.deprem.gazi.edu.tr/upload/20071103143847.pdf)
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USAID’s Disaster Risk Management Benchmarking Tool
The Benchmarking Tool was prepared for the Caribbean Open Trade Support Program
(COTS), funded by the United States Agency for International Development.8 The central
objective behind this study was ‘to improve the ability of national governments, civil society
organizations, and the private sector to proactively plan and implement effective and efficient
actions that would reduce their vulnerability to natural disasters and create greater economic
resilience when they do occur’.9 Although the tool was prepared for Caribbean countries in
particular, it was designed to be applicable to other countries more broadly. Having aimed at
creating a comprehensive, non-technical, and simple-to-implement tool, the Benchmarking Tool
is a comprehensive disaster management framework built on the basis of an extensive literature
review. Thereafter, it addresses six components of DRM activities: risk identification, risk
mitigation, risk transfer, disaster preparedness, emergency response, and recovery. While the
first four components are part of the pre-disaster phase, the last two components deal with the
post-disaster phase of risk management. In addition, each component is composed of four areas.
The four components of the pre-disaster phase are seen in Table 2.

8

Disaster Risk Management Benchmarking Tool, Prepared for USAID Caribbean Open Trade Support Program,
2006
9
The Benchmarking Tool, p.9
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Table 2: Pre-Disaster Components of Risk Management10
Risk Identification

Risk Mitigation

Risk Transfer

Disaster
Preparedness

Hazard assessment

Physical and
engineering
mitigation works

Insurance and
reinsurance of public
infrastructure and
private assets

Early warning and
communication
systems

Vulnerability
Assessment

Land-use planning
and building codes

Financial market
instruments

Contingency
planning

Risk assessment

Economic incentives
for pro-mitigation
behavior

Privatization of public
services with safety
regulation

Networks of
emergency
responders

Hazard monitoring
and forecasting

Education, training
and awareness about
risks and prevention

Calamity Funds
(national or local
level)

Shelter facilities and
evacuation plans

To assess the DRM status of a country, the Benchmarking Tool creates indexes for each
of the six components of DRM. Then, it generates an overall Disaster Risk Management Index
(DRMI). To do so, the Tool employs three hundred sixty six (366) assessment questions.11 For
each assessment question, three responses are provided: yes, no, and planned. The answers are
then coded as 3, 0, and 1 respectively. After that, a separate index for the six components of
DRM is created along with the DRMI-overall index.
Although each component of DRM involves specific assessment questions, one can
notice important commonalities across these questions. In this regard, five key issues should be
noted: presence/absence of DRM element (hazard maps i.e.), presence/absence of relevant
10

The table is derived from “Table 1: Key Components of Risk Management”, Inter-American Development Bank
(2000) – Facing the Challenge of Natural Disasters in Latin America and the Carribean: an IDB Action Plan-, cited
in “Disaster Risk Management Benchmarking Tool”, USAID, p. 10
11

The number of questions for each component of DRM is as follow: risk identification (99), risk mitigation (52),
risk transfer (38), disaster preparedness (87), emergency response (51), rehabilitation and reconstruction (39). DRM
Benchmarking Tool, p.12. For the list of assessment questions, see pages 14-30.
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policy/legislation, local level involvement/local capacity, education-public awareness, and the
level of international support. However, some components of DRM include assessment questions
that are related to only a few of these five issues. For example, risk transfer assessment questions
do not include anything about international support. Despite these variations across different
DRM components, the five issues could be very helpful in providing a short-cut analysis of
DRM status of a country. In the next section, the paper will assess the status of Turkey’s predisaster phase of DRM through a particular focus on these five issues.

Pre-Disaster Risk Management in the post-1999 Turkey
Following the conceptualization of Disaster Risk Management in the Benchmarking
Tool, this section will examine Turkey’s pre-disaster risk management status by focusing on four
components: risk identification, risk management, risk transfer and disaster preparedness. Each
component also comes with four elements.

Risk Identification
The risk identification component of DRM involves four elements, namely hazard
assessment, vulnerability assessment, risk assessment, and hazard monitoring and forecasting.
Hazard assessment primarily deals with the preparation of hazard maps for all relevant hazard
types. The maps need to be reliable and updated regularly. In addition, it is critically important
that people are aware of these maps. At the policy level, whether or not certain legislation exists
for the creation of up-to-date hazard maps is also significant. Vulnerability and risk assessment
elements are built upon these hazard assessments, but they go further by elaborating on the
potential physical, social, and economic implications of identified hazards. Finally, hazard
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monitoring and forecasting not only keep hazard assessments up-to-date, but they also augment
preparedness measures.
In terms of risk identification, post-1999 Turkey has taken several important steps. The
August 17, 1999 earthquake was a major accelerating event in this area. While the seismic
hazard map already existed (see figure 1), two important developments after the earthquake have
improved Turkey’s capacity in the areas of vulnerability and risk assessment. First, the
Earthquake Master Plan for Istanbul (EMPI), prepared by Turkey’s four leading universities for
the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul, was a milestone event for the city.12 The EMPI
consists of a seismic assessment, urges rehabilitation of existing buildings on the basis of risk
profiles, touches upon education and social issues, and develops a framework for disaster risk
management. The Master Plan also calls for a three-part action plan: a (i) contingency plan, (ii) a
local action plan, along with (iii) research and activity programs.
The second major development after 1999 in the area of risk assessment has been the
creation of the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) in June 2009. The
establishment of AFAD has been quite useful in improving coordination within the DRM field.
The AFAD has taken over the function of three institutions that were working in the field before
June 2009. Particularly important, the new Presidency has incorporated key components of
Disaster Risk Reduction into its institutional structure. It has departments related to earthquake
risk management, planning and mitigation, recovery, civil defense and response.13 Henceforth,
its structural configuration had the potential to provide more effective and powerful mechanisms

12

The full-text of the Master Plan is available at the website of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. (Published in
2003; 569 pages:
http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/SubSites/IstanbulVeDeprem/Calismalarimiz/Documents/IBB.IDMP.ENG.pdf)
13
The English version of the AFAD’s website is available at: http://www.afetacil.gov.tr/Ingilizce_Site/index.html
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for different components of DRM. The two departments (earthquake, and planning and
mitigation) focus on the pre-disaster phase of DRM.
The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency has three boards for the execution
of better DRM practices: the (i) Disaster and Emergency Management Higher Board (minimum
two annual meetings), the (ii) Disaster and Emergency Management Coordination Board
(minimum four annual meetings), and the (iii) Earthquake Advisory Board (minimum four
annual meetings). In the last meeting of the Earthquake Advisory Board (October 25, 2010), the
Board decided to finalize workings on the preparation of a ‘National Earthquake Strategy’ by the
end of 2010. In addition, the board meeting reviewed the following DRR related issues: studies
for the earthquake database, earthquake hazard maps, earthquake scenarios and risk analyses,
education and public awareness, earthquake safe settlement and buildings, as well as legal and
financial issues.14
In the Benchmarking Tool, assessment questions for risk identification involve issues in
five major areas: the absence/presence of hazard maps for all relevant disasters, the existence of
policy-legislation, local capacity/involvement, education/public awareness, and support from
international actors. Although post-1999 Turkey has realized some important progress as
discussed above, it has also failed in several important areas. First of all, though the August 17,
1999 earthquake resulted in the acceleration of risk assessment for earthquakes, Turkey
continues to lack hazard maps for floods, landslides and wild fires. Floods are the second most
disastrous hazard type in the country, killing 1,235 people, and destroying 61,000 houses in 1308
floods between 1955 and 2002.15 (See tables 3 and 4 for more information on Turkey’s flood
statistics.) Despite the fact that floods continue to be one of the country’s major disasters, Turkey
14

The meeting reports (in Turkish) are available at the website of the Earthquake Advisory Board:
http://www.deprem.gov.tr/sarbis/DDK/DDK_WEB.htm
15
The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement
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has yet to develop hazard maps for floods. Currently, the Ministry of Public Works and
Settlement is working with the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works and the Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Affairs to prepare a national hazard map for floods.16 Nevertheless,
Turkey remains without hazard maps for the other major hazards facing the population,
landslides and wild fires.
Table 3: Major Floods in Turkey17
Date
Sept 11,1957
June 19, 1990
July 13, 1995
Nov 4, 1995
May 21, 1998
August 7, 1998
May 21-25, 1998
July 23, 2002
Oct 31, 2006
Sept 7, 2009
August 27, 2010

Affected Area
Ankara
Trabzon
Isparta
Izmir
Zonguldak-Filyos
Trabzon-Beskoy
Western Black Sea Region
Rize
Diyarbakir
Istanbul
Rize

# of Deaths
180
45
75
65
27
60
10
40
22
31
12

Table 4: 1975-2009 Floods18
Period
1975-79
1980-89
1990-99
2000-09

# of Floods
160
152
102
281

# of Deaths
85
63
310
176

Economic Damage $ US
57 Million
1.5 billion
2 billion
160 million

16

“Turkiye’nin Sel Risk Haritasi Cikarilacak- Turkey’s flood risk map to be launched”, August 1, 2009 http://www.netgazete.com/News/618653/turkiyenin_sel_riski_haritasi_cikarilacak.aspx
17
The information is derived from the following sources: Mustafa Altundal, “The Economic Dimension of Floods”,
The Ministry of Environment and Forestry, March 2010
(http://www.dsi.gov.tr/duyuru/2.UlusalTaskinSemp/PANEL%20SUNULARI/Panel%205.%20Taskinlarin%20Sosy
olojik,%20Psikolojik,%20Ekonomik%20Boyutu%20[PDF]/5.4.TASKINLARIN%20EKONOMIK%20BOYUTU%
20[M.ALTUNDAL].pdf and Ceylan et al 2007, “Causes and Effects of Flood Hazards In Turkey”
http://www.dsi.gov.tr/english/congress2007/chapter_4/105.pdf and EM-DAT, The International Disaster Database
(http://www.emdat.be/database).
18
Source: Mustafa Altundal, “The Economic Dimension of Floods”, The Ministry of Environment and Forestry,
March 2010
(http://www.dsi.gov.tr/duyuru/2.UlusalTaskinSemp/PANEL%20SUNULARI/Panel%205.%20Taskinlarin%20Sosy
olojik,%20Psikolojik,%20Ekonomik%20Boyutu%20[PDF]/5.4.TASKINLARIN%20EKONOMIK%20BOYUTU%
20[M.ALTUNDAL].pdf )
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At the policy level, Turkey’s 1959 Disasters Law (Law No: 7269) focuses on the postdisaster phase of DRM, particularly emergency aid, neglecting efforts that would contribute to
risk reduction such as risk assessments. As discussed earlier, the creation of AFAD in 2009 has
been an important step at the institutional level, but so far it has not generated hazard maps for
non-earthquake hazards. That said, the current draft for the Law of Disaster, Emergency Aid, and
Civil Defense incorporates pre-disaster dynamics of DRM with the inclusion of risk assessment,
risk mitigation, and disaster preparedness provisions.19 The draft also has articles concerning the
preparation of hazard maps for all relevant hazard types.
The risk assessment component of DRM has also substantial deficiencies at the local
level. Neither the AKOM (The Center for Studies on Disaster Preparedness of the Istanbul
Metropolitan Municipality20) nor the AFAD’s directorates in the cities have any capacity for risk
assessment. In regard to the public awareness of hazard maps, Turkey fails to a great extent.
Given the fact that the country does not have hazard maps (except earthquakes) for all relevant
disasters, the lack of knowledge at the public level should not be surprising.
Finally, the role of international actors in Turkey’s record on improving its risk
assessment capacity has been very limited. Except for the cooperation between the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality in the area
of earthquakes, Turkey has not received any support from the international DRR community in
the preparation of hazard maps.
Overall, the risk assessment component of DRR in post-1999 Turkey needs further
improvement at various levels: the preparation of hazard maps for all relevant disasters, the

19

The full-text of the legislative draft (in Turkish) is available online at:
http://www.afetacil.gov.tr/mevzuat/kanun/AFAD%20Kanun%20Tasarisi.pdf (31 pages)
20
http://www.ibb.gov.tr/sites/akom/Documents/iletisim.html. For English:
http://www.ibb.gov.tr/sites/akom/Documents/AKOM_STUDIES_ON_DISASTER_PREPAREDNESS.pdf
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enactment and effective implementation of the new Disasters Law, which incorporates the predisaster phase of DRR, the enhancement of local capacity in the preparation of hazard maps and
hazard monitoring, increasing public knowledge and consciousness about hazard maps, and
greater support from the international DRR community.

Risk Mitigation
The Benchmarking Tool divides the risk mitigation component of DRM into four areas:
(i) physical and engineering works (ii) land-use planning & building codes (iii) economic
incentives for pro-mitigation behavior, and (iv) education, training, and awareness about risks
and prevention. Turkey’s performance in risk mitigation during the post-1999 period resembles
its progress in the realm of risk identification. Despite some important and positive institutional
and legislative developments, the country needs to take further steps forward, particularly in the
enforcement of building codes and supervision of construction, building retrofitting, the
implementation of urban regeneration projects, increasing the role of local governments in this
process, and enhancement of top level political commitment to risk mitigation for all hazard
types.
As pointed out in the earlier part of this paper, Turkey did have a building code, adapted
from the Uniform Building Code in California, well before the devastating 1999 earthquake.
However, poor implementation of the 1975 building code resulted in the serious human and
economic toll of the 1999 quake. After the earthquake, the Turkish parliament adopted the Law
of Construction Supervision (Law No: 4708, July 2001) to ensure the successful implementation
of building code. For this purpose, the Law sanctioned private Building Inspection Firms to
assess all construction projects and report to local authorities, which regulate the construction
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and occupation of buildings.21 In the beginning, the Law applied to only 19 of Turkey’s 81 cities.
But, the fact that 70 percent of the country’s cities have first and second level risks for
earthquakes, it has become essential to apply the Law more broadly.22 Although the action was
taken quite late, Decree 624 (July 2010) has made the Law of Construction Supervision
enforceable in all cities.23
The massive human and economic toll of the August 17 earthquake has demonstrated that
building retrofitting and urban regeneration projects should have priority in the city of Istanbul.
The Earthquake Master Plan for Istanbul (2003) and the draft for the new Disasters Law (2010)
have noted the significance of urban regeneration projects; however, only a few projects have
been realized so far.24 With regard to building retrofitting, the Turkish government has
undertaken a joint project with the World Bank to mitigate seismic risks in Istanbul (‘Istanbul
Seismic Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness Project’). The project is composed of four
components: (i) enhancing emergency preparedness, (ii) seismic risk mitigation for public
facilities, (iii) enforcement of building codes, and (iv) project management.25 In addition, the

21

Gulcan Uluturk 2006, Local Administrations and Disaster Risk Management in Turkey, Unpublished M.S Thesis,
Middle East Technical University, Ankara, p.105-6
22
Ibid, Ozmen 2000, 17 Agustos 1999 Izmit Korfezi Depreminin Hasar Durumu- The Damage Condition of the
August 17, 1999 Earthquake
23
For the text of the law 4708 and the decree 624 (in Turkish), see the following pages:
http://www.yapidenetim.org.tr/mevzuat/kanun/4708_sayili_yapi_denetim_kanunu.php
and
http://www.alomaliye.com/2010/4708_sayili_yapi_denetimi.htm The decree will be entered force on January 1,
2011.
24
For example, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality launched an urban regeneration project in the district of
Zeytinburnu in 2008. The Municipality, which has plans for other projects, has also established a directorate for
urban regeneration.
(http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/Pages/Haber.aspx?NewsID=15984 and
http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/Kurumsal/Birimler/KentselDonusumMd/Pages/AnaSayfa.aspx)
25
Ibid, Local Administrations and Disaster Risk Management in Turkey, p.120-1
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European Investment Bank decided to allocate 200 million Euros in October 2010 to help Turkey
retrofit public buildings and schools.26
The establishment of a new Disasters Presidency (AFAD), along with the Earthquake
Advisor Board, is definitely an important development in post-1999 Turkey. Particularly
important, the AFAD and the draft for the new Disasters Law have incorporated pre-disaster
components of DRM, including risk mitigation, into their operations. Considering that Turkey’s
old Disasters Law (1959) neglected important aspects of the pre-disaster phase of DRM, the
AFAD and the draft law should be considered important steps for risk mitigation.27 The AFAD
has a directorate for risk mitigation issues, while the draft law includes a section for risk
mitigation with a focus on hazard maps, urban regeneration, land-use planning, and supervision
of construction.28 Turkey, as a disaster prone country, should have incorporated such pre-disaster
components of DRM earlier in order to avoid the serious damages it has suffered from past
natural hazards such as the 1999 earthquake.
In addition to physical/engineering works and land-use planning/building codes, the
Benchmarking Tool takes note of economic incentives for pro-mitigation behavior, along with
education/training/awareness about risks and prevention. With regard to economic incentives for
pro-mitigation behavior, post-1999 Turkey has not had any development. However, it has made
some progress in the latter element of risk mitigation (education/training i.e.). The newly created
AFAD and the ongoing draft of the New Disasters Law include elements to increase public
awareness for risk mitigation. In addition, Turkey has received support from the international
26

“Turkiye’ye 200 Milyon Deprem Fonu- 200 million Euros Funding of Earthquake for Turkey, October 23, 2010,
CNNTurk,
http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/ekonomi/genel/10/23/turkiyeye.200.milyon.euro.deprem.fonu/594075.0/index.html
27
‘The Disasters Law’ (1959); Law No: 7269. The text in Turkish is available online in the website of the Ministry
of Public Works and Settlement: http://www.bayindirlik.gov.tr/turkce/html/kanun12.htm
28
The Draft Law; section 2, articles 4-9:
http://www.afetacil.gov.tr/mevzuat/kanun/AFAD%20Kanun%20Tasarisi.pdf
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community. For example, the United Nations Development Program has undertaken a project for
disaster prevention in cooperation with the Turkish government and universities29 aimed at
raising local capacity and public awareness of risk mitigation strategies. Moreover, the American
Red Cross, the Turkish Red Crescent Society, and Bogazici University have executed a project
for non-structural mitigation.30 This project has attempted to develop a cadre of community
instructors across Turkey who will eventually introduce non-structural mitigation programs into
schools across the country. Incorporating education about risks and prevention into the school
system are of central importance for risk mitigation. Thus, Turkish authorities are now planning
to put training for hazards into school curricula. The ongoing study on the ‘National Earthquake
Strategy’, which is being prepared by the Earthquake Advisory Board, will also deal with this
issue.31
Overall, Turkey has made some progress in implementing the risk mitigation component
of DRM in the period following the 1999 earthquake. A new law has been created for the
supervision of construction. The current draft of the new Disasters Law has a vision
incorporating pre-disaster components of DRM, including risk mitigation. The Istanbul
Metropolitan Municipality has launched urban regeneration projects. And, the newly created
Disasters Presidency (AFAD) has a directorate for risk mitigation. In spite of these positive
steps, Turkey’s current DRM profile, particularly its risk mitigation component, has fundamental
deficiencies in terms of the enforcement of building codes across the country, building
retrofitting, urban regeneration, as well as education/training about risk mitigation.

29

See; http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/documents/publications/corporatereport/europe/turkey1.pdf
See; http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/pubs/disasters/resources/about-disasters/cs-turkey.pdf
31
The Earthquake Advisory Board meeting on June 14, 2010.
(http://www.deprem.gov.tr/sarbis/DDK/DDK_WEB.htm)
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Risk Transfer
The Benchmarking Tool focuses on four areas when analyzing the risk transfer
component of Disaster Risk Management: the (i) insurance and reinsurance of public
infrastructure and private assets, (ii) financial market instruments, (ii) privatization of public
services with safety regulation, and (iv) calamity funds (national or local level). Turkey’s record
shows that it has had some success in the first and last policy areas, while the second and third
risk transfer mechanisms are substantially deficient.
Until the August 17, 1999 earthquake, Turkey had a state-led insurance system for
natural disasters. The country’s 1959 Disasters Law made the state responsible for damages
related to natural hazards. After the earthquake, an important change happened in the
management of natural hazard insurance. The Turkish government, through Decree No: 587
(December 1999), established the Compulsory Earthquake Insurance system (CEI), eliminating
the state obligation to cover disaster losses for residential buildings constructed after September
2000 within the boundaries of municipalities.32 Public/official buildings, along with residential
buildings in rural areas, have remained outside of the CEI, considered an important limitation.33
To handle the CEI, the Turkish government established a Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP).34
The TCIP had 2,428.000 policies in 2001, 3,436.000 in 2009, and 3,156.000 in 2010 (as of
December).35 As of 2009, only 27 percent of residential buildings were under the coverage of the
TCIP. Particularly notable is the substantial variation across the country in terms of compulsory
earthquake insurance. (See the Table 5) Moreover, the CEI system covers only damages due to
32

Full-text of the Decree 587 (in Turkish) is available online at: http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/10073.html
Ibid, Local Administrations and Disaster Risk Management in Turkey, p.103-5
34
The website of the Turkish Catastrophe Insruance Pool is available in English at: http://www.tcip.gov.tr/ The
following paper by Selamet Yazici who is the Head of TCIP Executive Board is also useful: “The Turkish
Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP) and the Compulsory Earthquake Insurance Scheme”.
(http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/114715/istanbul03/docs/istanbul03/11yazici3-n[1].pdf)
35
For information about the TCIP statistics, see: http://www.tcip.gov.tr/istatistik1.html
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earthquakes, while leaving out damages caused by other disasters, such as floods, the second
most disastrous natural hazard in the country,36 another significant limitation of the CEI.
Table 5: Earthquake Insurance, Penetration Rates by Regions (2009)
Region

Total Residence

Insured Residence

Aegean / West
Mediterranean / South
Eastern Anatolia / East
Southeast Anatolia
/Southeast
Marmara / Northwest
Central Anatolia / Central
Black Sea / Northwest
Turkey TOTAL

2, 045 662
1, 663 126
597 554
757 098

540 124
307 607
82 064
84 462

Penetration
Rates %
26.40
18.50
13.73
11.16

4, 416 073
2, 227 055
1, 282 096
12, 998 664

1, 433 919
760 514
227 171
3, 435 861

32.47
34.15
17.72
26.45

Source: Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool Compulsory Earthquake Insurance (DASK), Annual Report
2009 (http://www.dask.gov.tr/data/dask2009en.pdf)

As stated earlier, post-1999 Turkey has done nothing related to developing ‘financial
market instruments’ to facilitate risk transfer or to ‘privatize public services with safety
regulations’. With regard to ‘calamity funds’, the record has been much better. Under the Office
of Prime Minister, Turkey has a national catastrophe fund. However, the country does not have a
catastrophe fund at the local level.

Disaster Preparedness
There are four areas in the Benchmarking Tool’s assessment of the disaster preparedness
component of DRM: (i) early warning and communication systems (ii) contingency planning (iii)
networks of emergency responders, and (iv) shelter facilities and evacuation plans. In these
areas, Turkey’s record is far from satisfactory, and many important steps should be taken
immediately to improve this situation.
36

Ibid, Local Administrations and Disaster Risk Management in Turkey, p.160
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While the Earthquake Master Plan for Istanbul (2003) notes the significance of
establishing earthquake early warning systems to avoid fires, explosions, and other damages
during earthquakes, and urgently calls for improving the existing systems (p. 60, 515), Turkey
has not realized a considerable level of progress in this area since the 1999 earthquake. Recently,
the draft text for the New Disasters Law (2010) makes the Disaster and Emergency Management
Presidency responsible for the coordination of efforts to establish early warning systems at the
national and local levels.37 In addition, the Bogazici University Kandilli Observatory Center
launched a project in 2010, in cooperation with the German Research Center for Geosciences, to
establish an earthquake early warning system.38 Although these efforts are positive
developments, Turkey does not currently have an effective early warning system for earthquakes
or other natural hazards.
In regards to ‘contingency planning’, developing ‘networks of emergency responders’,
and establishing ‘shelter facilities and evacuation plans’, Turkey’s performance has not been
much different from its progress in improving its early warning and communication systems. The
draft text for the New Disasters Law has several articles about contingency planning for disasters
at the district, city, and national levels.39 Currently, the Disaster and Emergency Management
Presidency and municipal governments are responsible for preparing and applying contingency
plans,40 however; there are substantial deficiencies in practice.

37

Ibid; article 5; http://www.afetacil.gov.tr/mevzuat/kanun/AFAD%20Kanun%20Tasarisi.pdf
“Kablosuz Deprem Erken Uyari Sistemi-Wireless Earthquake Early Warning System”:
http://www.teknolojide.com/kablosuz-deprem-erken-uyari-sistemi_2805.aspx
39
Ibid; article 10-15; http://www.afetacil.gov.tr/mevzuat/kanun/AFAD%20Kanun%20Tasarisi.pdf
40
For the duties of municipalities regarding contingency planning, see Municipalities Law, 5393 (2005); article 53
(http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5393.html) and Provincial Special Administrations Law, 5302 (2005); article 69
(http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/k5302.html)
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Conclusion
The August 17, 1999 earthquake was the second most devastating seismic activity in
Turkey’s history in the past hundred years. While causing huge human and economic losses, the
earthquake has also resulted in changes in Turkey’s Disaster Risk Management. This paper has
attempted to examine the status of Turkey’s pre-disaster risk management in the post-1999
period with the use of categorization and assessments by the USAID’s Disaster Risk
Management Benchmarking Tool (DRMBT). Overall, the paper concludes that Turkey has made
some important progress in pre-disaster risk management, particularly with the enactment of
obligatory earthquake insurance and the stricter supervision of construction. However, many
elements of DRM are substantially deficient.
In the past ten years Turkish authorities and the disaster studies community have paid
greater attention to Disaster Risk Management policy. The recent draft text for the New Disasters
Law reflects the Turkish authorities’ eagerness to follow best practices in DRM. For example,
Mehmet Ersoy, head of the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, emphasized the
Presidency’s focus on risk management in his press release for World’s Disaster Day in October
12, 2010, instead of the conventional focus on emergency aid.41 The ongoing effort to change the
1959 Disasters Law, which totally neglects the pre-disaster phase of DRM, with a new one, is
definitely an important and positive development.
Despite the existence of some positive changes in Turkey’s conception and practice of
pre-disaster components of DRM after the August 17 earthquake, the country is far away from
establishing satisfactory DRM practices. As a result, the possibility of extraordinary human and
economic losses due to earthquakes, floods, landslides and wildfires continues to exist.
41

His statement is available (in Turkish) online at the website of the Disaster Presidency (AFAD) http://www.afetacil.gov.tr/haber/haber_detay.asp?haberID=107
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Particularly notable has been the high amount of attention given to earthquakes by Turkish
authorities, while other hazards have been largely ignored. The lack of hazard maps for floods,
landslides and wildfires is an obvious reflection of this neglect. Furthermore, institutional and
legislative frameworks for DRM remain highly centralized in Turkey, providing local
governments with neither the authority nor capacity to affectively manage and reduce risks. This
centralization is one of the most significant problems facing comprehensive DRM throughout the
country. Finally, Turkey also suffers from substantial deficiencies in education and training
about natural hazard risks. The school curriculum does not cover risk mitigation and disaster
preparedness. Developing a nation-wide culture focused on disaster risk reduction and
preparedness should be an essential part of DRM activities. In this regard, the Turkish authorities
and academic community have to allocate more resources for studies on DRM. Improving
contact and cooperation with the international DRR community could be very helpful in
enhancing Turkey’s performance in the DRM field.
To conclude, post-1999 Turkey has taken some positive steps in the realm of Disaster
Risk Management; nevertheless, it continues to have deficiencies in several areas. To address
these deficiencies, political commitment is critical. While recent efforts to produce a new
Disasters Law incorporating pre-disaster risk management components should be highlighted,
only its successful enactment and implementation could tell us about the prospects for
comprehensive DRM in Turkey’s near future.
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